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I. INTRODUCTION
The essence of the corporate form is that it offers financial protection
to the parties involved. Individuals wishing to begin a business can do
so without putting themselves at risk of substantial personal liability.
Likewise, corporations can secure financing through outside
shareholders without concern that the misdeeds and misfortunes of their
equitable owners will create problems. This desire for protection
reflects the reality that creditors, both voluntary and involuntary, will
seek to attach any assets they are legally able to in order to satisfy the
debts owed them.
This continuing conflict between debtors hiding behind the shield of
the corporate form and their creditors has resulted in substantial case law
on piercing the corporate veil. In the prototypical case, a creditor with a
right to the assets of an undercapitalized corporation seeks to execute
against the assets of the party who owns and controls the corporation. 1
If the owner has intentionally abused the corporate form to profit
excessively and shield himself from loss while disregarding the
possibility of harm to third parties, the theory holds that this creditor
should collect from the owner as if he and the corporation were one.
This practice, while tightly regulated, is widely accepted.
Less frequently, parties will try to pierce the corporate veil “in
reverse.” “Outsider” reverse piercing occurs when a party with a claim
against an individual or corporation attempts to be repaid with assets of
a corporation owned or substantially controlled by the defendant. 2 In
doing so, plaintiffs attempt to increase the ease of collecting on their
* Associate Member, 2010–2011 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank Professor Barbara Black for her feedback and comments on this subject matter, as well as
Shawn Weyrich for her constant encouragement, support, and feedback.
1. See infra Part II.
2. In “insider” reverse piercing, by contrast, the controlling members will attempt to ignore the
corporate fiction in order to take advantage of a benefit available to the corporation, such as an interest
in a lawsuit or protection of personal assets. For a more complete analysis of the distinction between
insider and outsider reverse piercing, see Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying
Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33 (1990). Outsider reverse piercing is the subject of the present
analysis, and references to reverse piercing hereinafter will refer to the outsider form unless specified.
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judgment by skipping the intermediary step of seizing the defendant’s
interest in the corporation. 3 Outsider reverse piercing flips the
traditional doctrine on its head by contemplating the seizure of corporate
assets in a suit against an owner.
What remains unsettled is how courts should handle the reverse
situation, where a corporation is held responsible for the debts and
misdeeds of its shareholder. At first glance, reverse piercing of the
corporate veil appears to require the same examination as traditional
piercing. 4 As such, with the notable exception of the Tenth Circuit, 5
reverse piercing grew to become increasingly accepted by state and
federal courts, often applying the same analysis. 6 On the other hand,
this simplified application of a distinct concept may be what Cardozo
warned of when he said “[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched,
for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
it.” 7 What do the two versions of piercing the corporate veil have in
common, other than a metaphor? In what ways is applying liability to a
corporation different than from an individual? How are the relevant
parties affected? Is reverse piercing necessary, or are there alternative
means of achieving the same end? If the doctrine is to have prospective
application, its relation to traditional veil piercing must be more closely
examined.
Outsider reverse piercing is supported by an analogy that breaks down
under scrutiny due to the different set of affected parties and the strength
of their interests. Other jurisdictions should follow the Tenth Circuit’s
lead and abandon it. 8 The purpose of this Comment is to examine
judicial application of the reverse piercing doctrine, from its beginnings
to the changes of the past few decades, as well as the underlying
reasoning presented by the courts for or against its application. After
providing a detailed analysis of traditional piercing of the corporate veil
in Part II, Part III illustrates how reverse piercing is handled by the
courts—from an identical analysis borrowed from traditional piercing to
a refusal to apply it and every gradation in between. Part IV uses the
3. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the traditional judgment collection methods).
4. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Acceptance and Application of Reverse Veil Piercing, 2 A.L.R. 6th
195 (2005) (“[R]everse piercing of the corporate veil . . . and traditional piercing . . . are viewed by the
courts as opposite sides of the same coin. The same considerations are usually at issue regardless of
which direction a third party attempts to reach through the veil.”).
5. See infra Part III.B (discussing the doctrine as it has developed within the Tenth Circuit).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
8. This has occurred to some extent, as jurisdictions have adopted the reasoning of Tenth
Circuit cases on reverse piercing. See, e.g., Acree v. McMahan, 585 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. 2003). As the
following sections will show, however, this adoption is far from uniform.
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multiple factors enumerated by the courts to analyze the reverse piercing
doctrine’s appropriateness as an equitable remedy as well as its
responsiveness to the rights of plaintiffs, defendants, shareholders, and
third-party creditors. Part V concludes that reverse piercing is too
dangerous to innocent parties to be preferred over existing judgment
collection tools and should thus be abandoned by all jurisdictions.
II. TRADITIONAL PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL—BACKGROUND
It is a basic concept of corporate law that corporations are legal
entities separate from their shareholders. In fact, this distancing of
individual from corporation has been referred to as the cornerstone of
American business law under the common law, allowing for individuals
to engage in business while limiting their personal liability should the
corporation fail. 9 Given the importance of the fiction of the corporation,
courts are understandably reluctant to pierce the corporate veil except in
extreme circumstances. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that piercing
of the corporate veil is allowed where maintaining the corporate fiction
would create an unjust result. 10 Where exactly this line should be
drawn, however, is unclear and varies widely, making piercing of the
corporate veil one of the most frequently litigated issues in corporate
law. 11
The relevant factors and typical scenarios are evident in an example
where piercing was permitted. In NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC
Communications, LLC, 12 LHC Communications (LHC) and its primary
investor Laurence Zimmerman were sued for breach of contract and
unsettled accounts. LHC was one of many companies started and fully
funded by Zimmerman, who used it to invest in various communications
and internet technology companies. 13
NetJets contracted with
Zimmerman, through LHC, to provide use of an airplane and related

9. See, e.g., De Breceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1987).
10. Much criticism remains, however, about the consistency of its application, particularly when
applied to limited liability entities. See, e.g., David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial
Responsibility, and the Limits of Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305 (2007).
11. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036 (1991).
12. 537 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2008). This case dealt with collection against a limited liability
company rather than a corporation. The court, however, found that LLCs have “limited liability akin to
the corporate form” and analyzed piercing in a manner indistinguishable from its application to
corporations, including citing authorities which referred only to corporations. Id. at 176 (quoting Elf
Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 287 (Del. 1999)); id. (citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns
Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992)).
13. Id. at 179.
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services. 14 Zimmerman invested and withdrew money from LHC at will
in informal transactions demarcated “loans” before LHC became
undercapitalized and stopped doing business altogether. 15 At the time,
over $300,000 in costs incurred were still owed to NetJets.16 After
noting that Zimmerman used the company as his alter ego 17 by
intermingling its funds with his own and not observing corporate
formalities, the court stated there was sufficient evidence that LHC had
become undercapitalized through unjustified withdrawals by and
purchases on behalf of Zimmerman. 18 This fact pattern, and the legal
analysis applied by the courts, is typical of veil piercing cases.
Courts determining the appropriateness of disregarding the corporate
form do so based on a number of factors that can be divided roughly into
two prongs: control and equity. 19 First, a plaintiff is required to
demonstrate that the person from which relief is sought had domination
of the corporation whose veil would be pierced. Sometimes termed
instrumentality, this is a central factor in piercing and the reason why the
“alter ego” doctrine is the label sometimes used interchangeably with
piercing. 20 Determining control can involve a look at the corporation’s
diversity of ownership, intermingling of corporate assets with those of
another person, and the observance of corporate formalities. 21 This can
readily apply both to the relationship between a parent corporation and
its subsidiary or one or more owners of a close corporation. In NetJets,
the corporation had a single shareholder, observed very few corporate
formalities, and intermingled its profits with the funds of its owner, all
evidencing Zimmerman’s control.
Secondly, the injury alleged must result from utilizing corporate
control for a fraudulent, illegal, or otherwise inequitable purpose. 22 This
14. Id. at 172.
15. Id. at 183.
16. Id. at 173.
17. The term “alter ego” applies in corporate law to a situation where the corporation is “a mere
instrumentality” of a controlling party so that the acts of one may be imputed on the other. XL Vision,
LLC v. Holloway, 856 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Bellairs v. Mohrmann, 716
So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)). Determination of alter ego status is highly intertwined with
the control prong and is sometimes treated as an independent test. See infra notes 81–91 and
accompanying text.
18. NetJets, 537 F.3d at 184.
19. See, e.g., Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 2009). This
of course is a great simplification of a complex, multi-factor analysis. Even wide ranging tests,
however, such as the twelve-factor analysis employed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jon-T
Chemicals, Inc. can be broadly grouped and separated according to these prongs. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.
1985).
20. See, e.g., XL Vision, 856 So. 2d at 1066.
21. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010).
22. See, e.g., NetJets, 537 F.3d at 177.
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may take the form of undercapitalization or fraudulent conveyance 23 in
the most typical cases. NetJets is a typical case of fraudulent
conveyance by the owner under the guise of personal loans, resulting in
undercapitalization and refusal to pay established debts. After canceling
his contract with NetJets, Zimmerman withdrew from the company an
amount greater than that owed to NetJets, proving that the corporate
assets were sufficient to pay the debt before Zimmerman’s
interference. 24
While the common law determination for piercing the corporate veil
is far from settled and uniform, the two-prong analysis provides an
accurate paraphrase of the evaluation conducted by some jurisdictions, 25
and a summary of the factors used in others. 26 The standard has
developed to examine the unique facets of a traditional piercing. The
central question is whether the corporation has taken particular actions
that amount to a waiver of the corporate veil’s protection of
shareholders. In developing a corresponding framework for dealing
with reverse piercing, courts would be required to determine how to shift
the focus to the actions of the individual as they affect the rights of the
corporation, its shareholders, and its creditors. As Parts III and IV will
show below, this altered focus has been slow to develop or ignored
altogether.

23. While “fraudulent conveyance” is used here to refer generally to secreting or misuse of
assets, it should be noted that fraudulent conveyance is its own term of art describing a creditor’s
remedy for dishonest distribution of assets, particularly in the context of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 (2006). For criticism of reverse piercing used as a shortcut to achieve the same end, see infra
notes 141–146 and accompanying text.
24. NetJets, 537 F.3d at 184.
25. See, e.g., Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086
(Ohio 1993) (“[T]he corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held liable for
corporate misdeeds when (1) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was so complete that
the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the corporation by
those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the
person seeking to disregard the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff
from such control and wrong.”).
26. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Water Whole Int’l Corp., 302 F. App’x 789, 793 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the factors include “‘(1) whether the dominant corporation owns or subscribes to all the
subservient corporation’s stock, (2) whether the dominant and subservient corporations have common
directors and officers, (3) whether the dominant corporation provides financing to the subservient
corporation, (4) whether the subservient corporation is grossly undercapitalized, (5) whether the
dominant corporation pays the salaries, expenses or losses of the subservient corporation, (6) whether
most of the subservient corporation’s business is with the dominant corporation or the subservient
corporation’s assets were conveyed from the dominant corporation, (7) whether the dominant
corporation refers to the subservient corporation as a division or department, (8) whether the subservient
corporation’s officers or directors follow the dominant corporation’s directions, and (9) whether the
corporations observe the legal formalities for keeping the entities separate.’” (quoting Gilbert v. Sec.
Fin. Corp. of Okla., 152 P.3d 165, 175 (Okla. 2006)).
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III. REVERSE PIERCING—DEVELOPMENT AND DIVERGENCE IN CASE LAW
Reverse piercing claims are rooted in the 1929 case of Kingston Dry
Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transportation Co. 27 Kingston, following
repairs made by the request of the defendant, Lake Champlain
Transportation, looked to collect debts owed by attaching the assets of a
subsidiary of the defendant. 28
The Second Circuit came out strongly against the application of the
veil piercing doctrine in reverse. To begin, there was nothing beyond a
shared set of directors to show that the subsidiary had participated
sufficiently in the action giving rise to the debt to create liability, much
less controlled the parent company. 29 The court went so far as to say
that reverse piercing would be appropriate only in rare circumstances, if
ever. 30 In dwelling upon the infrequency with which control by a
subsidiary could be found, the court implicitly recognized that a
traditional veil piercing analysis is inapplicable. 31
While this would appear to signal a developing break in the common
law between traditional and reverse piercing, the Second Circuit rooted
its decision entirely in the traditional analysis, citing its decision in
Costan v. Manila Electric Co. 32 to show that the central element was the
issue of control. 33 Proceeding through this lens, the court looked at the
level of control that the subsidiary had, particularly its influence on its
parent company with regard to the specific action giving rise to the debt
at issue. 34 As there was no evidence of the subsidiary intervening in the
actions of its parent or attempting to make the parent an agent of the
subsidiary, the court reasoned, there was no control exercised by the
subsidiary, and reverse piercing would be inappropriate. 35
The court failed to conduct a full analysis of how closely reverse
piercing cases resembled their traditional counterparts, and to what
extent the same interests were involved. In so doing, Judge Learned
Hand provided muddled reasoning that presaged the reverse piercing
debate that exists to this day. In the eighty years since Kingston,
jurisdictions have distinguished themselves based on whether they apply
old tests to unique facts (as in Kingston), look at reverse piercing as a
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

31 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
24 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1928).
Kingston, 31 F.2d at 267.
Id.
Id.
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wholly distinct (and perhaps misguided) concept, or fall somewhere in
between.
The remainder of this Part outlines the factors considered and tests
applied in these cases. Subpart A will look at examples of courts strictly
applying the traditional two-prong test. Subpart B will look at the
opposite trend: courts ruling out any application of reverse piercing.
Finally, Subpart C will explore the wide range of factors and
considerations applied by other jurisdictions. This will set the stage for
Part IV’s analysis of the best approach to reverse piercing.
A. The Two-Prong Test—The Emergence of Reverse Piercing
One of the first jurisdictions to embrace the practice of reverse
piercing was the State of Washington following its Supreme Court’s
decision in W.G. Platts v. Platts. 36 In Platts, Beatrice Platts obtained by
attachment land owned by the plaintiff corporation according to a
divorce settlement between Beatrice and Willard Platts.37 The dispute
arose when this lien was challenged by the corporation. 38 The court
cited to the ruling precedent in the jurisdiction regarding traditional
piercing of the corporate veil and applied its two-prong test without
alteration. 39 The court found that Willard did “control and use the
corporation as a tool or instrument for carrying out his own plans and
purposes,” justifying liability. 40 Unlike Kingston, the Platts court did
not specifically require that the controlled corporation be somehow
involved in the conduct that was the subject matter of the suit. 41 While
the equity prong was applied, it had a unique application in this case
because Willard had agreed to the attachment during negotiations over
the divorce settlement, treating the corporation as a marital asset. 42
Therefore, the court reasoned, it would be unconscionable to use the
corporate form as a shield relieving him of agreed to obligations. 43
Strict adherence to the two-prong test is perhaps most clearly present

36. 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956).
37. Id. at 1108.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1110–11 (citing Platt v. Bradner Co., 230 P. 633 (Wash. 1924)).
40. Id.
41. But cf. Ackerman v. Sobol Family P’ship, LLP, No. CV030826123, 2004 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1270 (Conn. Super. May 12, 2004) (dismissing a reverse piercing claim that failed to allege
sufficiently that the corporation, acting under the control of the individual defendant, was the source of
the inequity).
42. Platts, 298 P.2d at 1108. Willard refuted that he had actually agreed, but the court found
otherwise based on documentation from the lower court. Id.
43. Id. at 1111.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 9
M-RICHARDSON

1612

9/24/2011 3:48:39 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

in New York, which routinely follows the precedent established in State
v. Easton. 44 Following a $7.5 million judgment against Karl Easton for
Medicare fraud, 45 the State of New York attempted to attach the assets
of two corporations, Cobble Hill Center Corp. and the 3 Lafayette
Avenue Corp., allegedly controlled by Easton. 46 Although no New
York precedent at that time had clearly established reverse piercing, the
Easton court felt that “conceptually ‘reverse’ piercing is not inconsistent
with nor antithetical to the salutary purposes of traditional piercing.” 47
Believing that the control and equity prongs, when properly applied,
could produce equally just results in reverse piercing cases, the court
held that the two-prong test should apply just as readily to reverse
piercing. 48 Lest there be any doubt about nuances differentiating the
two versions of piercing, the court provided one of the most definite
statements yet written about the handling of reverse piercing: “[t]he
direction of the piercing is immaterial where the general rule has been
met.” 49
The Easton standard was recognized as law in New York when it was
adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in American Fuel Corp.
v. Utah Energy Development Co. 50 American Fuel sought to use the
reverse piercing doctrine not for a collection of damages, but to bind
Utah Energy to an arbitration agreement signed by its president, Robert
Nead, as part of an employment agreement with American Fuel. 51
Although the American Fuel court reversed the lower court and refused
to pierce the corporate veil in reverse, it did so because it found that the
two-prong test had not been satisfied. 52 Specifically, the presence of a
co-founder with equal involvement negated allegations of Nead’s
44. 169 Misc. 2d 282 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). While only a lower court decision, Easton was
recognized by the Second Circuit as representing New York law, and has since been cited numerous
times as the guiding precedent in reverse piercing cases. See Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co.,
122 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Spinnell v. J.P. Morgan, 59 A.D.3d 361 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009); Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane, 6 A.D.3d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
45. People v. Brooklyn Psychosocial Rehab. Inst., 585 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
46. Easton, 169 Misc. 2d at 283. While Easton did not personally own any portion of the
corporations, the entirety of their stock was owned by his infant children, who graciously allowed him to
act as president. Id. at 284.
47. Id. at 289.
48. Id. at 289–90.
49. Id. at 290.
50. Am. Fuel, 122 F.3d at 130. New York law was relied on in spite of the fact that the
defendant was incorporated in Utah because “[a]t oral argument, both parties stressed that the law of
New York and Utah is virtually identical regarding piercing of the corporate veil, and we follow their
lead.” Id. at 134. This is slightly ironic given the interpretation of Utah law by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
51. Id. at 131.
52. Id. at 134–35.
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absolute control, and the specifics of the alleged breach of contract were
not sufficiently fraudulent or wrongful. 53 The court unequivocally held
that “New York law recognizes ‘reverse’ piercing,” 54 and has since been
cited for that proposition. 55
As exemplified by these cases, the simplest and most intuitive
approach to reverse piercing cases is a straightforward application of the
traditional veil piercing test that predated reverse piercing cases and is
still widely accepted. 56 The result is an analysis that focuses exclusively
on the conduct and status of the party sued to determine if the party has
control over the corporation and if equity dictates relief beyond the
assets of that party.
B. The Tenth Circuit Doctrine—The Disposition of Reverse Piercing
Far from the strict application of the traditional two-prong test
preferred in New York, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has been a
leading proponent of severely limiting reverse piercing, or even
eliminating it altogether. A seminal case arguing against reverse
piercing of the corporate veil is Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v.
Banks, 57 which arose from a dispute between parties with partial
interests in an underperforming gold mine in Eastern California. 58 The
plaintiff, Cascade Energy & Metals Corporation (Cascade), was
primarily owned by W. David Weston. 59 After purchasing the
goldmine, Cascade entered into a joint venture with two other
corporations partially owned and controlled by Weston and Cascade. 60
Working interests were then sold to thirty-five individual investors, who
agreed to provide working costs and pay royalties for the product of the
mine. 61 When production at the mine remained below expected levels
and continued losing money, Cascade initiated the suit against individual
investors who refused to pay further assessments that Weston had
53. Id.
54. Id. at 134.
55. See, e.g., Ammirato v. Duraclean Int’l, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 2d 210, 220 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Some New York courts continue to cite Easton rather than American Fuel. See, e.g., Spinnell v. J.P.
Morgan, 59 A.D.3d 361, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
56. These are far from the only jurisdictions to, in at least some circumstances, apply the simple
two-prong test. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991)
(citing Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1985)); Emmons v.
Hometown Builders, No. CV-09-046, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 84 (Me. Super. Sep. 21, 2010).
57. 896 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1990).
58. Id. at 1563.
59. Id. at 1561–62.
60. Id. at 1564.
61. Id.
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informed them were necessary to continue operating the mine. 62 The
investors countered that Weston had fraudulently misdirected Cascade’s
funds for personal use and committed securities violations. 63 After a
series of cross- and counter-claims, virtually all the parties with an
interest in the mine became a party to the suit, as well as various
companies partially or totally owned and controlled by Weston.64
The relevant portion of the district court’s decision held that Weston
and the Weston Companies were jointly and severally liable for the
wrongful actions of Weston. 65 The basis of the holding was that the
companies were mere alter egos of Weston, justifying a reverse veilpiercing to reach the assets of each controlled corporation. 66 The Tenth
Circuit reversed the lower court, providing several reasons to reject the
theory of reverse piercing altogether: (1) the presumption is that the
corporate form should not be disregarded; (2) reverse piercing would
unnecessarily bypass traditional judgment collection procedures; (3)
innocent shareholders of the corporations would be harmed; and (4)
there are traditional, well-established theories of law that accomplish the
same goals without the need to recognize a duplicative new theory of
reverse piercing. 67
While these arguments presented clear reasons to abandon reverse
piercing, the court fell short of plainly holding reverse piercing should
never be recognized by also arguing that it should not apply to the
specific facts in the case. Namely, the court held that the Weston
Corporations were sufficiently distinct from their owner, that they could
not be termed alter egos, that Weston’s ownership of other companies
was not instrumental in the fraud he perpetuated, and that reverse
piercing was less appropriate in consensual relationships than in the
context of torts. 68
The Tenth Circuit again provided a clear condemnation of reverse
piercing in Floyd v. IRS. 69 Thomas Bridges was the sole shareholder
and director of two corporations, each of which paid Bridges’s salary to

62. Id. at 1566.
63. Id.
64. Id. These companies in which Weston had a controlling interest in shall hereafter be referred
to as the “Weston Companies.”
65. Id. at 1574.
66. While this exact phraseology was not used by the lower court, the Cascade court
extrapolated this basis from the underdeveloped analysis of why joint and several liability was
appropriate. Id. at 1575.
67. Id. at 1576–77.
68. Id. at 1577–78.
69. 151 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 1998).
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a third corporation he controlled. 70 The IRS, the State of Kansas, and a
group of judgment creditors all asserted claims against Bridges and his
companies, giving rise to a dispute over priority. 71 In particular, the
parties asked the Court to determine if priority rights to the Bridges
Companies’ assets could be obtained through a tax lien against Bridges
using a reverse piercing theory, as the lower court had determined. 72
In reversing the lower court decision, the Floyd court began by
referring back to the lines of reasoning set forth in Cascade before
adding new arguments in opposition to reverse piercing. 73 The court
noted that reverse piercing makes it possible (as occurred in the present
case) for business creditors to have their rights subsumed by creditors of
an individual shareholder. 74 In addition to being unfair to those
creditors who could not predict losing priority in such a manner, the
court also predicted that it could damage businesses ability to obtain
credit as a result of the greater fear of losing assets. 75
This doctrine can be identified as one unique to the Tenth Circuit,
even more so than its constituent states individually. While both
Cascade and Floyd were framed as interpretations of governing state
law 76 —Utah and Kansas, respectively—a superficial analysis shows that
little input from state courts was considered. In fact, the Floyd court
acknowledged that the Kansas Supreme Court recognized reverse
piercing, but reasoned that this holding was limited to a jurisdictional
context. 77 Similarly, the court in Cascade referred to the Utah Supreme
Court’s decision in Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc. 78 only to
quote it calling reverse piercing “little-recognized.” 79 The Cascade
court chose not to mention that the Messick court went on to apply the
traditional two-prong veil piercing test and deny the reverse piercing
only because the alter ego test was not satisfied. 80
70. Id. at 1296. These companies shall hereafter be referred to as the “Bridges Companies.”
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1297.
73. Id. at 1299.
74. Id. (citing In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991, 1000 (Bankr. D. Col. 1995)).
75. Id.
76. See Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990); Floyd,
151 F.3d at 1299. Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases likewise refused to allow veil piercing claims “[i]n
the absence of a clear statement” by state courts on the matter. See In re Denton, No. 99-6059, 2000
Colo. J. C.A.R. 524 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 2000) (unpublished) (The court’s decision is also referenced in a
“Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing at 203 F.3d 834 (10th Cir. 2000).).
77. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1299 n.4 (citing Fahra v. Signal Cos., 532 P.2d 1330 (Kan. 1975),
modified, 535 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1975)).
78. 678 P.2d 791 (Utah 1984).
79. Cascade, 896 F.2d at 1575 n.17.
80. Messick, 678 P.2d at 794–95.
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Whether it be termed the ruling law of Utah, Kansas, or the Tenth
Circuit itself, the precedent established in Cascade and Floyd provides
an even simpler framework for deciding on claims of reverse piercing:
under all circumstances, deny. The Tenth Circuit clearly sees the ample
legal alternatives to reverse piercing as superior to the risk of damage to
third parties with an unprotected interest in the assets of a besieged
corporation. Many of the same concerns voiced in Cascade and Floyd
can be found (individually or in some combination) in the cases
discussed in the following subpart.
C. The State of the Law—Divergent Application of Reverse Piercing
If the two-prong test and the Tenth Circuit doctrine can be seen as
opposite ends of the spectrum, state courts and the federal courts
applying their law have explored nearly every shade in between. Each
jurisdiction attempting to find the proper rule of law—or at least proper
resolution of the case at bar—has looked at different factors in
determining where to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable reverse piercing of the corporate veil. The result in some
cases is not a clear test at all, but merely one or more factors deemed
relevant in that particular case. In order to provide an overall picture of
the legal landscape, it is necessary to look at the divergent circumstances
that have swayed jurisdictions on whether reverse piercing is an
acceptable practice.
In McCall Stock Farms, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit focused heavily on whether the entities involved
were alter egos of each other. 81 John and Phyllis McCall were the sole
proprietors of the McCall Stock Farms, Inc. (MSFI), in which they
invested a loan made to them by the Small Business Administration
(SBA). 82 When the McCalls defaulted, the SBA attempted to collect by
offsetting payments made to MSFI by the Agricultural Stabilization and
Conservation Service, a Department of Agriculture program. 83 The
court’s analysis consisted mainly of delineating the ways in which the
McCalls had ignored proper corporate form. 84
81. 14 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The court intentionally declined to distinguish whether its
ruling was made under Iowa or federal common law, viewing them as the same on the relevant issues.
Id. at 1569 n.6.
82. Id. at 1564.
83. Id. at 1564–65.
84. Id. at 1569 (“It is undisputed that MSFI had no savings account, no financial reserves, no
investments, and no assets apart from a few pick-up trucks. All the land subject to MSFI’s operations
was casually leased to it without formal instruments, and all the farm equipment was owned personally
by the McCalls and leased to MSFI. No capital was invested in the corporation. The individuals made
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The McCall court did not analyze whether the corporation was being
used to perpetuate a fraud or inequity or make an explicit finding on the
equity prong. While the court explained that even traditional veil
piercing required only constructive and not actual fraud, the court did
not delineate how the facts of the case represented even constructive
fraud. 85 The McCall decision simplifies the two-prong test to a single
prong by relying solely on a finding that one party was the alter ego of
another, even if the controlled entity was not used in a fraudulent
manner. 86
A similar but far more restrictive test has been recently applied by
California courts. California courts have a broad policy prohibiting
reverse piercing to reach corporate assets. 87 In In re Schwarzkopf, 88 the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals showcased the narrow exception to
California’s general policy against reverse piercing of the corporate
veil. 89 According to the court, trusts determined to be the alter ego of
the debtor lose their status as independent legal entities. 90 As a result,
the assets of an alter ego trust (and no other corporate entity) are
vulnerable to reverse piercing under current California law. 91
McCall may also be considered as an example of deference to the
collection of debts by the government. Courts appear to be least
resistant when the matter involves collecting taxes from a trust or other
entity in which the delinquent taxpayer has a controlling interest. 92 In
United States v. Bigalk, the government attempted to collect estate taxes
it found owing from a farm the defendants allegedly transferred
fraudulently to a trust prior to the owner’s death. 93 The U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota stated that it was to “look to state law
when determining whether an entity is the alter ego of a taxpayer.” 94

loans to the corporation that were never repaid. These loans to MSFI were not formally documented,
had no terms of payment, and bore no interest. MSFI never paid its corporate officers any salary or
other compensation. The corporation never declared any dividends. Mr. and Mrs. McCall made all the
decisions regarding the corporation’s farm business.”).
85. Id. at 1568.
86. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851 (D.P.R. 1987).
87. See, e.g., Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1512–13 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008).
88. No. 08-56974, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24046 (9th Cir. 2010).
89. Id. at *12 (citing Postal Instant Press, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 1512).
90. Id. at *12–*13 (citing Wood v. Elling Corp., 572 P.2d 755, 762 (Cal. 1977)).
91. Id. at *13.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980
(D.S.D. Mar. 22, 2010); Century Hotels v. United States, 952 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1992) (disregarding that
Louisiana precedents did not recognize reverse piercing claims).
93. 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009).
94. Id. at 994.
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Defendants cited Minnesota law that reverse piercing was not
accepted. 95 The court did not dispute the validity of reverse piercing
under Minnesota law, but rather held that “[r]everse piercing is a wellestablished theory in the federal tax realm.” 96
The deference to the government in tax cases may also be explained
by the reasoning that avoiding tax payments is itself sufficient to satisfy
the equity prong. 97 This reasoning, however, is not as often applied to
hiding assets when a government agency is not involved. 98 Compared
to federal agencies, bankruptcy trustees have faced a much more mixed
reception when trying to reach assets of a third party corporation owned
by the debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy. In re Schuster 99 addressed a
trustee attempting to reach assets of the North Scooter Inn. The debtor
had given his wife his one-half interest in the corporation a year prior to
filing for bankruptcy. 100 Similar to the reasoning in the tax evasion
cases, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota held that
reverse piercing should be allowed—and the opposing motion to dismiss
denied—because allowing the debtor to shield his assets by hiding them
in a corporation until the debt was discharged would itself be
inequitable. 101 This may explain why other districts have allowed
reverse piercing in bankruptcy disputes even when it is undisputed that
the debtor did not intend to defraud any creditors and when the formal
elements of a fraudulent conveyance are not addressed. 102
In Daily v. Lilipuna Associates, 103 the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
this “prevailing trend” of bankruptcy courts permitting reverse piercing
claims. 104 The court, however, dismissed the claim before it as the
debtor was not a shareholder when he filed for bankruptcy, which the
95. Id. at 995.
96. Id. (quoting United States v. Scherping, 187 F.3d 796, 803 (8th Cir. 1999); cf. Century
Hotels, 952 F.2d at 110 (citing Owens & Sons, Inc. v. Guastella East, Inc., 354 So. 2d 571 (La. Ct. App.
1977) (distinguishing state case law opposed to reverse piercing by saying it did not render a decision on
the relevant issue, contrary to a plain reading of the case)).
97. Brownfield Inv. Corp., Nev. v. United States, 74 A.F.T.R. 2d (RIA) 5452 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unpublished) (The court’s decision is also referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported
Opinions” appearing at 28 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1994).).
98. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
avoidance of a judicially imposed recovery was not on its own sufficient to satisfy the equity prong);
Thomsen Family Trust v. Peterson Family Enters., 989 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
transfer of stock in a family farm to a trust that the debtor owned 98% of on the basis that the
corporation was not involved in any wrongdoing).
99. 132 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
100. Id. at 606.
101. Id. at 612.
102. See In re Mass, 178 B.R. 626, 630 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
103. No. 95-16370, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8391 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 1996).
104. Id. at *10.
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court believed to be a controlling factor in similar cases. 105 The court
was not moved by the fact that the debtor’s shares had simply been
transferred to his children for allegedly less than reasonable value. 106
Government agencies and bankruptcy trustees are not the only class
of plaintiffs held to a different standard in deciding reverse piercing
issues. A Connecticut Superior Court in Stotz v. Everson 107 dismissed a
reverse piercing claim arising from a lease. The corporation to be
pierced occupied the space originally leased by one of its owners, John
Everson, who had ceased making payments under the lease. 108 The
court differentiated between tort claimants and those bringing an action
such as breach of contract, stating that it had “serious reservations about
granting equitable relief in what is essentially a breach of contract
action.” 109 Because the plaintiff’s claim was a breach of a lease, a pure
contract claim, the court held that exceptional circumstances would be
required to find that an equitable remedy such as reverse piercing was
warranted. 110
In some jurisdictions, particular interest is paid to the potential for
collateral damage to innocent third parties, stock holders in particular.
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota in United States
v. Boscaljon, gave relatively wide approval to reverse piercing, but
specified that it was appropriate only “when no innocent individual
would be harmed thereby.” 111 This requirement was supported, albeit in
less strong terms, by the Supreme Court of Nevada in LFC Marketing
Group, Inc. v. Loomis, 112 which upheld a lower court’s decision to
permit reverse piercing in reliance upon the finding that the innocent
shareholder of the corporation would not be harmed by forfeiting its
assets for the debt of a vice president with no direct ownership of the
corporation. 113
Some courts have attempted to determine reverse piercing claims
solely through the application of agency law. In Flight Services Group
v. Patten Corp., Patten, a defendant in a suit over the sale of an airplane,

105. Id. at *10–*12.
106. Id. at *4. Accord In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991 (Bankr. D. Col. 1995).
107. No. CV94 06 29 06, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3106 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994).
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *3.
110. Id.
111. United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980, at *12 (D.S.D.
Mar. 22, 2010).
112. 8 P.3d 841 (Nev. 2000).
113. Id. at 847. The Nevada Supreme Court, while mentioning the need to protect innocent
shareholders, did not further examine the district court’s finding that attaching $25,000 in accounts
payable to a corporation solely owned by an innocent party would not harm that owner.
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brought a counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty based on actions in
the operation of a third company, Berkshire. 114 Two of Flight Services
Group’s (FSG) owners had an ownership interest in Berkshire as well. 115
The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed the
counterclaim on the basis of agency law, stating that “[i]t does not make
sense to impose liability on an agent for the actions of the principal
where the agent is not otherwise liable.” 116 FSG, the agent, was not
responsible for the actions of its principals to the extent they affected
another entity.
Another factor of interest for some courts has been the number of
steps in between the individual and the corporation alleged to be an alter
ego. In Zahra Spiritual Trust v. United States, the government looked to
collect taxes due from Fadhalla and Muneera Haeri out of the assets of
Dar Al-Hikmah, incorporated in the Netherlands, and Mudin Inc., a
domestic corporation. 117 Both corporations were controlled by the
Haeris and owned by the Haeri Trust, and their sole function was to own
property that was freely used by the Haeris without a lease or other
formal agreement. 118 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
a strong belief that a piercing was justified because the corporation’s
assets were freely used by and intermingled with the property of the
Haeris, yet remanded the case without allowing a reverse piercing. The
trial court had determined control of the corporations by the Haeri Trust,
but had not made a direct finding regarding the Haeris’ control of the
trust. 119
The Zahra court relied in part on a decision by a Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, George v. Houston Boxing Club, Inc. 120 The dispute in George
was an alleged breach of contract, for which George sought relief from
K.S. Adams. 121 Adams advanced all the money used to start the
Houston Boxing Club (HBC), was not repaid for this “loan,” and
received all of the remaining assets when HBC was dissolved. 122 While
he was not technically the owner, Adams held all of HBC’s stock in trust
for his children. 123 The court, in stating that the alter-ego test had not
been satisfied, noted that “we find no Texas cases applying the alter ego
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

963 F. Supp. 158 (D. Conn. 1997).
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
910 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’d, 38 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 246.
423 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1967).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 131.
Id.
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doctrine to a situation where the individual owned none of the
outstanding stock.” 124 The George court simply held that the use of a
trust nominally shifting ownership is sufficient to defeat the control test.
The court declined to take the extra step of analyzing why Adams’s
control over the trust was insufficient to establish control.
In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. CMC Construction Co., 125 the
determining factor was not the formalities of the trust, but the form of
the relationship between the debtor and the party being pierced. Tara
Asher, the debtor, had transferred $400,000 into Asher Investments
Partnership (AIP), which Hartford Fire Insurance Company wanted to
reach. 126 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
did not need to examine the relationship between Asher and AIP beyond
determining that Asher was a natural person and shareholder in AIP.127
Tennessee courts, the court explained, recognize reverse piercing only to
reach a subsidiary’s assets based on the debts of a parent corporation. 128
An individual shareholder engaging in acts indistinguishable from those
that would justify reverse piercing in a parent/subsidiary situations
would thus have no liability under Tennessee law, and reverse piercing
was not allowed in Hartford. 129
Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro v. Kane 130 added an additional
element to the equity prong: the purpose of incorporation. One of the
defendants, Amy Kane, had an outstanding debt to two law firms. 131
After incurring the first debt but before initial judgment was rendered on
either, Kane and her husband incorporated Gin Properties, Inc., which
they used to purchase a residence for themselves. 132 The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court made a point of noting that
the corporation was formed knowing of the outstanding debts and
seemingly in order to avoid satisfaction of any judgment on those debts
by hiding the couple’s joint assets. 133 While the court did not treat this
124. Id. at 132. As the court did not find a breach of contract, this finding falls under the category
of dicta, but it has been no less relied on as the reference to it in Zahra shows.
125. No. 3:06-CV-11, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86826 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2010).
126. Id. at *7–*9. Hartford also brought a claim under the Tennessee Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act regarding the same transaction, which the court did not render a decision on. Id. at *65.
127. Id. at *67–68.
128. Id. at *67 (citing Cont’l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625, 632–33
(Tenn. 1979)).
129. Id. at *68.
130. 6 A.D.3d 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
131. The first law firm represented her in her duties as executrix of a will, and the second was
retained to help her defend a suit against the first for unpaid fees. After a settlement of the first debt was
negotiated, Kane refused to pay either party. Id. at 73–74.
132. Id. at 74.
133. Id. at 78.
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as mandatory, it is an easier analysis when the very formation of the
corporation appears fraudulent. 134
Some courts, without directly outlining a scenario under which
reverse piercing is permissible, share the Tenth Circuit’s preference for
utilizing traditional judgment collection methods wherever possible. 135
In Owens & Sons, Inc. v. Guastella East, Inc., 136 a creditor sued the
Guastella East corporation on a promissory note signed only by its
owners. 137 The Supreme Court of Louisiana found that if the owners
were found to be titleholders to the assets sought, they could be levied
directly. 138 Alternatively, the plaintiff could receive the benefits of the
corporation’s assets by selling the owners’ shares and using the proceeds
to pay the debt. 139 Therefore, the court reversed the decision of the trial
court and found Guastella East not liable for the debt of its owners. 140
While inconsistent, the approaches taken in the various jurisdictions
all share a desire to find an equitable solution to the disputes before
them. Of course, the courts are limited to the factual situation and
arguments before them, which can detract from the development of a
coherent doctrine. A consistent analysis of all the rights and interests
involved in reverse piercing is lacking from the current case law.
Without considering the precedential value of a particular test when
applied to the variety of situations in which reverse piercing attempts
may arise, later courts are left either to misapply the doctrine or rely on
different reasoning in every instance where the claim arises. In order to
encourage a comprehensive analysis of reverse piercing, Part IV will put
the reasoning provided by various courts into a broader context to
determine what the appropriate approach to reverse piercing should be.
IV. DISCUSSION
Assuming there is one overarching solution to handling this type of
claim that can be evenly and fairly used, the analysis that leads to it must

134. See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851, 878 (D.P.R. 1987)
(“Otherwise, manifest injustice would result from treating Vilmasor and Lumaral as separate entities
when in fact they have merely been personal business conduits of the defendant used and designed for
the only purpose of hindering, defrauding and delaying the creditors of Martinez and Amieiro.”).
135. See, e.g., Stoltz v. Emerson, No. CV94 06 29 06, 1994 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3106, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1994).
136. 354 So. 2d 571 (La. 1977).
137. The plaintiff claimed the defendant corporation had signed the note, but this was erroneous.
Id.
138. Id. at 572.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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be found in drawing out the reasoning the above jurisdictions have given
for the stance they take on reverse piercing. Broadly, these rationales
can be grouped into two categories: an analysis of available alternatives
in the law and a look at the impact various stances would have on the
rights of all parties potentially affected. This Comment proceeds by
looking at the reasoning within these categories and determining how
well they apply to the unique situation of reverse piercing of the
corporate veil.
A. Misuse of an Equitable Doctrine—The Alternatives to Reverse
Piercing
Central to the holdings of Cascade and Floyd is that reverse piercing
is not used because it is a necessary evil, but perhaps in spite of the fact
that more clearly defined and traditionally accepted alternatives exist.
This can be done either through measures after achieving judgment on
the underlying complaint or adding the target corporation as a defendant
under a different charge.
Plaintiffs who bring and win a suit against any defendant are able,
even without reverse piercing, to take advantage of the assets of a
wholly or partially owned and controlled corporation. Traditional
judgment collection procedures allow for the creditor following
judgment to levy the assets of the defendant, including shares in a
corporation not named in the suit. 141 While there is certainly a danger
that the corporation will attempt to shift its assets in order to avoid such
a judgment, alternative methods of combating this secondary fraud
already exist. In addition to seeking attachment of the interest prior to
litigating the suit, judgment creditors can protect collection through
applicable fraudulent transfer laws. 142 In the area of tax collection, these
laws have been of particular interest to some courts in applying reverse
piercing. 143 Treating transfers as constructive dividends allows some
additional access to these assets of the corporation. 144
Forcing collection to go through the traditional channels would be
141. But see Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 312 n.14 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (finding that an attempt to attach distributions from the corporation would have been fruitless as
the defendant simply used corporation assets to pay her debts, but not commenting on other judgment
collection methods).
142. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Almodovar, 671 F. Supp. 851, 881 (D.P.R. 1987) (finding the
transfer rescindable as fraudulent after finding the same subject assets recoverable through reverse
piercing).
143. See United States v. Bigalk, 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009).
144. Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 1998); see also 10 JACOB
MERTENS, JR. ET AL., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 38B:71 (2005).
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advantageous to many parties involved in such a dispute directly or
indirectly. Where there are other shareholders in the target corporation,
traditional collection strikes the best balance for protecting their interests
and rewarding the judgment creditor. Whether the creditor takes control
of the shares or they are sold to a third party with the proceeds going the
creditor, the shares become an asset. The new holder would have an
incentive to make economically rational decisions that benefit the
corporation or resell the shares for value. Even if the new owner used
majority ownership to force dissolution, other shareholders would be
guaranteed their proportional share of the dissolved corporation. There
would be no risk of innocent third parties losing their entire investment
because essential assets were sold off to pay the debts of a majority
owner.
Where creditors would be rightfully wary of relying on the sometimes
arduous judgment collection process, there are alternative legal theories
that would allow corporations to be joined as defendants without using
an unpredictable reverse piercing approach. Namely, counts raised
against the corporation for aiding and abetting or under general agency
principals could succeed under similar circumstances to those present in
many reverse piercing cases. While the burden of proof on these counts
would make collection potentially more difficult than simple judgment
collection, it would be similar to the extant control test. As this requires
that plaintiffs establish a link between the conduct that is the subject
matter of the suit and the corporation itself, voluntary creditors would be
able to protect themselves through investigation of the corporation prior
to entering into any contractual relationship.
Perhaps the most important advantage of these alternatives to reverse
piercing is that they are more true to the purposes of equitable remedies
in our legal system. As many courts have noted, reverse piercing is an
equitable doctrine. 145 Therefore, it should be allowed exclusively where
the requesting party is without an equivalent remedy at law. 146 As this
Subpart has demonstrated, there are alternative methods of achieving
similar results within the court, and each may have benefits as compared
to reverse piercing of the corporate veil. In the absence of any
compelling reason to continue allowing reverse piercing beyond the
convenience of judgment creditors, reverse piercing should be set aside
in favor of alternative, well-established legal remedies.

145. See, e.g., Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne, 183 F.3d 347, 358 n.21 (5th Cir. 1999); McKinney v.
Gannett Co., 817 F.2d 659, 666 (10th Cir. 1987).
146. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300; see also 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 41.25, at 162–66 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 2006).
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B. The Rights of the Parties Under Reverse Piercing
1. The Principal Actors—Judgment Creditors and Wrongdoing
Defendants
As demonstrated above, the deceptive fiction beneath reverse piercing
is that it is identical to the traditional situation and can thus be handled
in the same manner, a fallacy fueled by a myopic focus on the principal
parties. Indeed, both traditional and reverse piercing of the corporate
veil act as mechanisms to transfer wealth from a dishonest defendant
found liable for wrong doing to a valiant judgment creditor. There is no
obvious public policy reason to prevent this transfer, and various
equitable reasons that it should be facilitated in the face of a party’s
fraudulent attempt to avoid liability by shuffling assets. As the cast of
characters with an interest in the transfer becomes more diverse, as will
be shown below, this rationale becomes much more convoluted.
Even in a scenario where there are no third parties to be affected by
the transaction, reverse piercing is still fundamentally an equitable
doctrine. 147 As such, it should only be applied where legal remedies are
unavailable or inadequate to protect the interests of creditors who are
seeking to pierce the corporate veil. 148 As previously illustrated, a
variety of state statutory and common law mechanisms are available to
achieve the same ends, many of which are more widely recognized and
have been for some time. To the extent that fraudulent transfer statutes
or attachment of the defendant’s shares would equally resolve the
dispute, reverse piercing is therefore inappropriate even if the rights of
third parties would not be affected.
2. Innocent Bystanders—The Uninvolved Shareholder
For traditional piercing, it is comparatively simple to protect the
interests of innocent shareholders in a corporation used for fraudulent or
illegal acts by a single controlling owner. In an ideal situation, placing
liability on the owner rather than the corporation could make protection
of shareholders a primary purpose rather than secondary effect. 149 The
mechanism for ensuring that the liability is extended only to responsible
parties is the control test, which examines the degree of control
exercised over the corporation by a single shareholder.
147. Floyd, 151 F.3d at 1300 (citing McKinley, 817 F.2d at 666).
148. Id. (citing WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 146, § 41.25, at 653).
149. But see D’Ambrosi v. Bayly Martin & Fay Int’l, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 5368, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7946 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 1987) (holding that New York law requires a corporation’s assets to be
exhausted before piercing the corporate veil to collect against shareholders or a parent corporation).
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In the context of a reverse piercing, however, a direct application of
the control test could lead to a grotesque misapplication of the law.
Several courts considering traditional piercing have held that complete
ownership is not a requirement; a mere significant interest and control of
the corporation’s operations suffice. 150 To apply this in the context of
reverse piercing would not protect other shareholders, but expose them
to an even greater degree to damages from the actions of another
stakeholder. 151
Long term, the investment patterns of individuals could come to
reflect this danger. A primary advantage of the corporate form is the
safety it provides from the overlap of individual and corporate debts.
Traditional piercing is resisted except in exceptional cases in order to
preserve this dichotomy, and the advantages of the separation flow both
ways. Investors in a business expect it to be relatively safe. Any risk in
the investment should ideally be ascertainable by due diligence into the
individual business’s practices as well as the industry overall. Reverse
piercing would require investors to acknowledge risk in the form of
unscrupulous owners. The result could be a retreat from small and midsize enterprises in favor of investing in publicly traded companies with
significantly lower risks of piercing. 152
In order to prevent this misapplication, courts would, at a minimum,
need to treat the existence of innocent shareholders as a separate and
absolutely dispositive consideration when determining if reverse
piercing is appropriate. 153 In C.F. Trust, the Virginia Supreme Court
provided a precedent for this, holding that it is the burden of the party
moving for reverse piercing to prove that innocent shareholders will not
be affected and to do so by clear and convincing evidence. 154
As explained above, an alternative to reverse piercing is to force
parties to attach the shares or ownership interest in the corporation.
Where there are minority shareholders, they would have an opportunity
to purchase a greater interest or at least a guarantee that a new holder of

150. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns v. Storm LLC, 587 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d,
351 F. App’x 467 (2nd Cir. 2009) (“A company that owns a majority stake in another controls that
company’s operations, even if it does not have 100% ownership.”).
151. See United States v. Boscaljon, No. CIV.07-4111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980 (D.S.D.
Mar. 22, 2010).
152. The lower risk is a result of diverse ownership, which makes satisfaction of the control prong
much more difficult and allows for broader oversight that can check behaviors likely to be egregious
enough to trigger the equity prong. This also follows with the trend in traditional piercing. See
Thompson, supra note 11, at 1047–48 (finding no successful piercing of a public corporation in an
empirical analysis of 1,583 cases involving an attempt to pierce the corporate veil).
153. See, e.g., Boscaljon, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26980.
154. C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P’ship., 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003).
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the shares will have an interest in making economically viable decisions
about the corporation’s assets. Even a corporation dissolved by a new
majority owner would have its assets distributed in a predictable manner
among shareholders. Minority shareholders would not find themselves
with an interest in a corporation of significantly less value overnight due
to a majority owner’s decision not to pay taxes.
3. Undermined Contracts—The Usurped Creditor
Like innocent shareholders, legitimate creditors of a corporation may
have an interest in its continued and successful operation that is left
unprotected in a dispute over reverse piercing. These parties do not
have a similar direct interest in the results of a traditional piercing of the
corporate veil. Parties extending credit to a corporation are capable of
examining the financial health of the corporation as well as its
outstanding debts. 155 When owners of sole proprietorships or other
small enterprises are asked to personally guarantee a business loan, the
loaning institution goes into the transaction understanding that adverse
actions of the individual could affect their interest and can modify the
terms of any loan accordingly. Conversely, a loaning institution would
not expect assets loaned to a corporation alone to be sold off to pay the
debts of its owner.
Essentially, judgment creditors and victims of torts may be given
preference over consensual creditors if reverse piercing is allowed with a
simple two-prong test. Indeed, reverse piercing could allow tort victims
to receive assets before the consensual creditors of either the individual
or the corporation. 156 This is largely inconsistent with the common law
treatment of traditional piercing, and precisely the reverse of many other
legal areas, which are often more reserved when victims of torts attempt
to gain the benefits of a corporation’s assets before its consensual
creditors. 157 Even in the case where the liability of the owner arises
155. Whether the inquiry is actually made is a separate issue that must be analyzed on a case-bycase basis. For example, the court in In re Mass allowed reverse piercing over the objection that it hurt
consensual creditors of the corporation because there was no proof an actual inquiry into the financial
strength of the corporation was made or relied on. 178 B.R. 626, 631 n.5 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
156. See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
157. See generally G. Michael Epperson and Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder’s Ultimate
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 632–33 (1988) (arguing that tort victims should be given
preference in piercing of the corporate veil because they are unable to investigate and choose their
judgment debtors, but noting that many courts have failed to make such a distinction); see also
Dombroski v. Wellpoint, Inc. 895 N.E.2d 538, 545 (Ohio 2008) (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward
tort, a basic example of unjust conduct; it does not represent the type of exceptional wrong that piercing
is designed to remedy.”); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966) (refusing to pierce the
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from exceptional circumstances, it is not clear that the rationale would
extend to reverse piercing unless the creditors of the corporation knew
that this threat to the corporation’s assets was a possibility prior to
initiating a contractual relationship.
The most important aspect of this from the perspective of creditors is
the predictability of having the corporation’s assets sold. If reverse
piercing is allowed, there would be no rational way to investigate a
business and determine the risk it presents. Reverse piercing is
commonly invoked in purely personal cases, including satisfaction of tax
debts 158 and settling marital assets in a divorce. 159
There are multiple implications to this collateral attack on the rights
of consensual creditors. First, attachment of the corporate assets raises
due process concerns with regard to creditors who have an interest in the
assets as collateral. 160 This is compounded by the fact that it could
undermine state laws alerting creditors to the dissolution of a
corporation. 161 If creditors take steps to shield themselves from this
increased risk, the result could be a general chilling of the ability of
small businesses with few owners to receive financing. 162 At the very
least, lenders may begin through altered risk calculations to spread the
cost of individual misdeeds across all small businesses. 163
Conversely, forcing parties to use traditional remedies does not
present the same risks. If shares in a corporation were sold rather than
its assets, the purchaser would immediately obtain an interest in
retaining the profitability of the corporation, protecting the investment of
outside creditors. Even to the extent that fraudulent transfer statutes
would still allow access directly to corporate assets, this would be
limited to assets not relied on in extending credit or that reasonable
investigation may show are obtained through inappropriate means. At
the very least, it would provide creditors with a more settled body of law
from which to calculate the risks inherent in lending.

corporate veil of an undercapitalized taxi cab corporation for the victim of an accident); Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058–59
(1991).
158. See United States v. Bigalk, 654 F. Supp. 2d 983 (D. Minn. 2009).
159. See W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 298 P.2d 1107 (Wash. 1956); Lyons v. Lyons, 340 So. 2d 450
(Ala. Civ. App. 1976).
160. In re Hamilton, 186 B.R. 991, 1000 (D. Col. 1995).
161. Id.
162. Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1299 (10th Cir. 1998).
163. For a more thorough analysis in this vein in the context of Fourth Circuit decisions impacting
Virginia’s appeal to small businesses, see Wendy B. Davis, The Failure of the Federal Courts to
Support Virginia’s Reluctance to Pierce the Corporate Veil, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 203
(2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
Attempts to make compensation for those victorious in lawsuits easier
are laudable, but it must be acknowledged that these actions rarely take
place in a vacuum. Any alteration to traditional judgment collections
should be fully examined by courts to determine its impact not just on
the parties to the case, but on other shareholders in or creditors of the
company to be subject to reverse piercing. The complexity of a
corporation’s structure is exceeded in many cases only by the web of
interactions it has. Furthermore, any expansion of methods for
accessing the assets of a corporation carries with it the risk of decreasing
loans and investments to small businesses and the chilling of economic
expansion that can incur. This Comment suggests that the direct and
indirect risks of reverse piercing are significant enough compared to the
marginal benefits to judgment creditors to justify complete abandonment
of the practice.
The Tenth Circuit’s wary approach to piercing the corporate veil
appears to be the correct one. At the very least, jurisdictions must take
care when deciding reverse piercing claims to ensure that all interests
are protected and all alternatives are considered.
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